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Abstract
Recent research on glass ceilings and sticky oors has focused on the magnitude of
di¤erences between groups in the upper and lower quantile cuto¤s of the conditional
wage distribution. However, quantile cuto¤s for di¤erent groups are only weakly infor-
mative of representation. For example, if the top decile cuto¤ is lower for minority than
majority workers, this tells us that minority workers are under-represented in the top
decile, but does not tell us the magnitude of the under-representation. In this paper,
we propose a direct measure of the representation of a population subgroup, which we
dene as the proportion of group members whose earnings lie below (or above) a pop-
ulation earnings quantile. Our representation index is easily generalized to condition
on characteristics (such as age, education, etc). Further, it generalizes naturally to
an index of the severity (or cost) of under-representation to group members, which is
based on dollar-weighted representation. Both representation and severity indices are
easily calculated via existing regression techniques. We illustrate the approach using
Canadian earnings data.
JEL Codes: C1, C44, J71,
Keywords: representation, glass ceiling, discrimination, quantile regression, expec-
tile regression
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1 Introduction
It is well established that women and some ethnic minorities earn less than comparable white
males (see e.g., Blau and Kahn (2000), Smith and Welch (1989), Pendakur and Pendakur
(2002)). One proposed explanation is that workers in these groups face a glass ceiling
that limits their access to the very best jobs in society. Another possible explanation is the
existence of a sticky oorthat crowds these workers into the very worst jobs in society. Both
of these mechanisms suggest that disadvantaged groups will be under-represented in some
parts of the earnings distribution and over-represented in others. In this paper, we present
a new index to measure the representation of population subgroups in di¤erent parts of the
population-level conditional earnings distribution. Our representation indices shed light on
both the existence and consequences of glass ceilings and sticky oors.
Our representation index is a useful addition to the applied researchers toolkit for at
least three reasons. First, it provides an intuitive and direct measure of a groups prevalence
in (or access to) a region of the population distribution of income (or earnings, wages, etc.) 
in both the unconditional and conditional sense. That is, under-representation in the upper
tail of the income distribution (for example) is an intuitive measure of disenfranchisement,
and directly measures the presumed consequence of a glass ceiling. Second, our index is (in
principle) completely nonparametric. It imposes no structure on the joint distribution of
income and covariates. Third, it is easy to implement with standard statistical methods and
popular software packages.
Although the idea of a glass ceiling is widespread, there has been surprisingly little
research by economists to establish its existence or assess its consequences. Recent research
has focused on the magnitude of di¤erences between groups in the upper and lower quantile
cuto¤s of the conditional wage distribution (Fortin and Lemieux (1998), Albrecht et al.
(2003), de la Rica et al. (2005), Kee (2005), Jellal et al. (2006)). For example, Albrecht et al.
(2003) show in their study of Swedish data that the conditional top decile cuto¤ of womens
wages is well below that of men and conclude that women face a glass ceiling. Pendakur and
Pendakur (2006) use similar methods to study the earnings of ethnic minorities in Canada
and nd disparity in the upper and lower quantiles. However, knowing the location of a
particular earnings quantile for di¤erent groups is only weakly informative of representation.
Consider the case where the conditional top decile cuto¤ of earnings is $10,000 lower for
women than men. This tells us that women are under-represented in the top decile of
the population conditional earnings distribution, but does not tell us the magnitude of the
under-representation.
In this paper, we propose a di¤erent strategy to identify and measure the impact of a
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glass ceiling or sticky oor. We dene the representation of a population subgroup (hereafter
group) as the proportion of group members whose earnings lie below (or above) a population
earnings quantile. We say that a group is under-represented in a region of the earnings
distribution if the proportion of the group in that region is smaller than the population
proportion. Conversely, we say that a group is over-represented if the proportion of the
group in that region is larger than the population proportion.
Consider a simple example. Suppose ten percent of the population earns more than
$100,000. We say a group is under-represented in the top decile of the population earnings
distribution if less than ten percent of the group earns more than $100,000. Of course a
groups representation will depend in part on group memberscharacteristics (e.g., educa-
tion, age, etc.), but we can easily generalize our notion of representation to condition on
characteristics. We can estimate (for example, via quantile regression or nonparametric den-
sity estimation) the top decile cuto¤ of the population earnings distribution, conditional on
observable characteristics, and ask what proportion of a particular groups members earn
more than this characteristics-dependent cuto¤. If the proportion is less than ten percent,
we say that the group is under-represented in the top decile of the conditional earnings
distribution.
Of course under-representation can take many forms. Disadvantaged group members
may be clustered close to the quantile cuto¤, or far below it. We therefore augment our
representation measure with an index of the severity (or cost) of under-representation that
weights representation by a function of dollar-distances from a cuto¤.
Our approach has two advantages over comparison of quantile cuto¤s to identify the
presence of a glass ceiling or sticky oor. First, it provides a direct estimate of the mag-
nitude of under-representation. Second, it provides a direct estimate of the cost of under-
representation to the disadvantaged group.
There is a recent literature that seeks to decompose di¤erences in the wage distribution
between groups (or time periods) into di¤erences due to characteristics and di¤erences due to
the returns to those characteristics. Examples include DiNardo et al. (1996), Donald et al.
(2000), and Machado and Mata (2005), who base their decomposition on nonparametric re-
weighting, hazard function estimation, and quantile regression, respectively. In these papers,
the object of interest is the entire marginal distribution of an outcome (e.g., wages). The
primary application of the decomposition is to construct counterfactual distributions that
would have prevailed if groups shared the same distribution of characteristics or returns to
characteristics.
Our objective here is di¤erent: we are interested in measuring representation a function
of the joint distribution of outcomes and covariates rather than estimating counterfactual
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distributions of outcomes. Consequently, our representation index is complementary to these
decomposition approaches in the following sense. One could construct a counterfactual
distribution by one of these methods, and obtain a meaningful summary of the outcomes of
group members that would have prevailed under the counterfactual distribution by comparing
representation in the counterfactual to the realized distribution.
Furthermore, whereas the quantile cuto¤approach and the decomposition approach both
typically analyze the entire (marginal or conditional) distribution, our methods are infor-
mative and interesting even if only a single quantile is investigated. This is because the
representation and severity indices summarize the entire (marginal or conditional) distribu-
tion above and below the quantile of interest. For example, a groups representation in the
top decile of income is informative even if we know nothing about representation at any other
quantile. This is particularly convenient when the researchers interest centers on outcomes
in a tail of the income distribution, as is the case when studying the consequences of a glass
ceiling or sticky oor.
The paper proceeds as follows. We rst develop a framework for modeling representation,
considering both conditional and unconditional approaches. Then, we extend our framework
to model the severity of under-representation. Finally, we illustrate the approach using
Canadian data.
2 Modeling Representation
Consider the distribution of earnings given a vector of characteristics X: The population
consists of individuals i = 1; :::; N each of whom is member of a group j = 1; :::; J . Let
Nj denote the number of members of group j. Let fj(y;X) represent the joint density of
earnings and characteristics for group j; and denote the population joint density of earnings
and characteristics by f(y;X). The conditional cumulative distribution function (conditional
cdf) of y given X for group j, Fj(yjX), is dened as
Fj(yjX) =
R y
0
fj(y;X)dyR1
0
fj(y;X)dy
: (1)
The  th quantile of y conditional on X for group j, qj( ;X), is the inverse of this conditional
cdf,
qj( ;X) = F
 1
j (jX): (2)
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Here, we have that
Fj(qj( ;X)jX) =
R qj(;X)
0
fj(y;X)dyR1
0
fj(y;X)dy
=  :
Similarly, the  th quantile of y conditional on X for the population, q( ;X), is dened by
F (q( ;X)jX) =
R q(;X)
0
f(y;X)dyR1
0
f(y;X)dy
=  (3)
where F (yjX) is the population conditional cdf.
We dene the conditional representation function, rj( ;X), as the proportion of group j
whose earnings lie below the  th population conditional quantile of y:
rj( ;X) = Fj(q( ;X)jX): (4)
The quantity rj( ;X) depends on X because the joint density of y and X may di¤er between
the groups that comprise the population. If, for some value of X, this quantity exceeds  ,
then at that value of X the group is over-represented in the region below  ; if it is less than
 , then the group is under-represented in that region.
When upper quantiles of the population conditional distribution of y given X are of
primary interest, it may be more intuitive to compare 1   rj( ;X) to 1    . In this way,
we can compare representation above population quantiles rather than below. We will refer
to such measures as abovemeasures, in contrast to the belowmeasures presented in this
section. Typically, it will be convenient to use below measures to study sticky oors and
above measures to study glass ceilings.
The conditional representation functions, rj( ;X) for j = 1; :::; J , in combination with
the population conditional quantile function, q( ;X), completely characterize the joint dis-
tribution of (y;X) for each group j. Thus, the set of functions rj( ;X) and q( ;X) contain
the same information as the set of quantile functions, qj( ;X).
Typically, quantile functions are not estimated for all possible values of  ; rather, they are
estimated for a sparse grid of  values, or sometimes even just a single value of  . Thus, an
important question is whether we learn more about glass ceilings and group representation in
a region of the earnings distribution from the representation function or quantile function at
a single value of  . We argue that the representation function more directly illuminates the
object of interest. Consider a simple example for a given vector of characteristics X. If the
representation of minority workers in the top decile of earnings is 0.06, then they are under-
represented by 40 percent. Alternately put, there are 40 percent fewer minority workers in
the top decile of earnings than we would expect given their characteristics X: In contrast, if
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we just use estimated quantiles and nd that minority workers have a top decile cuto¤ that
is $10,000 below that of majority workers, we know that they are under-represented, but we
dont know by how much. The representation function provides direct information on the
object of interest: the degree to which a denable group of individuals is represented in a
region of the conditional earnings distribution.1
The fact that rj( ;X) depends on X is desirable. It corresponds to a lack of parametric
assumptions regarding the joint distribution of y andX in each group j. However, this lack of
structure comes at a price. Evaluating the magnitude of rj( ;X) for any particular value of
X is in principle a nonparametric problem that may have a very slow rate of convergence ifX
is high dimensional in its continuous elements (its discrete elements do not a¤ect convergence
rates). Furthermore, because rj( ;X) depends on X; its magnitude for any particular value
of X is not revealing of representation for the group as a whole. A summary statistic based
on averaging rj( ;X) solves both of these problems.
A convenient summary of representation for group j is the average value of rj( ;X) over
all members of the group. By averaging over individuals, we implicitly average over their
characteristics X with weights corresponding to the distribution of characteristics in group
j. We denote this average as rj(); and dene our conditional representation index as
rj() =
1
Nj
X
ij
rj( ;Xi): (5)
The conditional representation index, rj(), is the average representation of group j below
the  th population conditional quantile cuto¤. If rj() exceeds  , then the group as a whole
is over-represented below the  th quantile of the population conditional distribution of y
given X; if it is less than  , then the group as a whole is under-represented in that region.
Since rj ( ;X) is dened as a function of F and Fj (the joint cdfs of y and X of the
population and group j) and because we place no restrictions on F and Fj, our conditional
representation function and index are completely nonparametric. If the dimensionality of X
is low, one can use nonparametric estimates of F and Fj to estimate representation. In cases
where the dimensionality of X is too high for a completely nonparametric approach, the
researcher can impose minimal parametric structure to facilitate estimation. One possibility
would be to employ nonparametric single (or multiple) index density estimation. A quantile
1One of the important features of representation is that it captures an object of interest that is quite
distinct from disparity in the conditional mean. For example, consider two groups whose joint distributions
of y;X have nite support over y and which di¤er only in location of y by a factor d. Here, the disparity is
the same at every quantile and all X, and the conditional mean functions also di¤er by d at all X. In this
case, even with small d, there will be an upper tail of the population distribution where the disadvantaged
group has zero representation.
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regression-based approach is an easily implemented alternative, as we now demonstrate.
For any particular value of  , we can easily estimate rj () using popular statistical soft-
ware (such as R, S+, or Stata) in two steps. First, estimate the population conditional
quantile cuto¤s from the quantile regression of y on X. The population conditional quan-
tile regression function, Q( ;X), satises P [yi < Q( ;X)] =  . We denote the quantile
conditional regression function with Q rather than q because quantile regression typically
imposes parametric structure on the problem, even though q is in essence a nonparametric
object. Second, given an estimate of the population conditional quantile regression function
Q^( ;X), construct predicted values Q^( ;Xi) for all i in group j. A sample estimate of the
conditional representation index for group j is given by
r^j() =
1
Nj
X
ij
I
h
yi < Q^( ;Xi)
i
where I is the indicator function. We note that Q^( ;Xi) may not be unique in nite samples,
but r^j () is unique.2
It is natural to ask under what circumstances the conditional representation function
rj ( ;X) is independent of X: That is, when does the conditional representation function
rj ( ;X) coincide with the conditional representation index rj ()? In fact, there may be
little variation in rj( ;X) over X even if the conditional cdfs, Fj (yjX), di¤er greatly across
groups. This is because representation is invariant to some transformations of the joint
distribution of y and X. The following proposition (proof in Appendix A) establishes that if
the conditional quantile functions qj( ;X) have the same shape over X for all j, but possibly
describe di¤erent quantiles for each j, then there is no variation in rj( ;X) over X.
Proposition 1 If j is a monotone increasing mapping from [0; 1] to [0; 1] and
Fj(yjX) = j (F1(yjX)) (6)
for all j = 2; :::; J; then rj( ;X) is independent of X:
3 Accounting for Characteristics
In many instances, it will be of interest to assess how individual characteristics contribute
to a groups over- or under-representation in a region of the earnings distribution. This is
2When the empirical cdf of yjXi has at regions, quantile cuto¤s in those regions are bounded but not
unique. Because r^j () implicitly integrates over at regions of the empirical cdf, r^j () is unique.
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easily done by comparing the estimated conditional representation index for group j, r^j(),
to the estimated unconditional representation of group j in the population distribution of
earnings.
The  th unconditional quantile cuto¤ of the population distribution, q(), solves
P [yi < q()] =  :
Let q^() denote a sample estimate of this quantity. Note that since q() does not depend
on X, neither quantile regression nor parametric structure need be employed to obtain the
estimate q^(). Instead, we may obtain q^() by sorting the data by Y . Our unconditional
representation index for group j, Rj(), is the proportion of group members whose value
of yi lies below the  th unconditional population quantile cuto¤: Rj() = Fj (q ()), where
Fj (y) is the unconditional cdf of earnings in group j: A sample estimate of the unconditional
representation index for group j is
R^j() =
1
Nj
X
ij
I [yi < q^()] ; (7)
i.e., the sample proportion of group j whose earnings lie below q^ ().
Consider the representation of group j in the bottom decile of the earnings distribution.
The value of r^j(0:10) gives the proportion of the groups members whose earnings are below
the population cuto¤ for the conditional bottom decile, controlling for variation in X. In
contrast, the value of R^j(0:10) gives the proportion of the groups members whose earnings
are below the population cuto¤ for the bottom decile of the unconditional distribution,
without controlling for variation in X. If, for example, R^j(0:10) = 0:20 and r^j(0:10) = 0:10,
then we say that poor characteristics explain the over-representation of group j in the bottom
decile of earnings. If, on the other hand, R^j(0:10) = 0:20 and r^j(0:10) = 0:15, we say that
poor characteristics do not explain all of the over-representation of group j in the bottom
decile, and that we observe 50% more members of group j in the bottom decile than in the
population as a whole, even after controlling for their characteristics.
4 Severity of Under-Representation
It is natural to ask whether under-representation in a region of the earnings distribution
has large or small consequences. If, for example, minorities are under-represented in the
top decile but over-represented in the top percentile, then the representation index rj(0:90)
would be above 0.90, but minority workers could actually be receiving much of the total
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earnings in the upper tail of the distribution. In this case, high representation in the top
percentile of the distribution might mitigate low representation in the top decile.
If we evaluated the representation index at all possible  , we could examine the complete
collection of representation indices. More realistically, however, if we only evaluate the
representation index for a sparse grid on  ; or even a single value of  , then it is desirable
to have some aggregator to supplement the representation index. A natural aggregator of
representation weights the representation below (above) a cuto¤ by (some function of) the
dollar amount of the deviation below (above) the cuto¤.
The expectile function (see Newey and Powell (1987)) denes a natural way to weight
these deviations. It can be expressed as the solution to a weighted version of the quantile
problem. The population quantile function given by (3) denes a cuto¤ q such that the
proportion of the density of earnings below q is  : In contrast, the expectile function denes
a cuto¤ e( ;X) such that the proportion of the weighted density of earnings below e( ;X)
is  : The weight used in the expectile function is the dollar value of the distance from the
cuto¤. The expectile function, e, is thus dened byR e(;X)
0
je( ;X)  yj f(y;X)dyR1
0
je( ;X)  yj f(y;X)dy =  ; (8)
which simply adds the weight je( ;X) yj to (3). Unlike quantiles, expectiles are unique even
if the cdf has at regions. For people earnings less than the cuto¤, je( ;X) yj = e ( ;X) y
gives the shortfallof earnings below the cuto¤, and for those earning more than the cuto¤,
je( ;X)   yj = y   e( ;X) gives the surplusof earnings above the cuto¤. The expectile
function denes the cuto¤ value such that the total shortfall is a proportion  of the total
shortfall plus the total surplus. For  = 0:50, the total shortfall equals the total surplus,
which characterizes the mean. Thus the expectile for  = 0:50 is the conditional mean,
which may be estimated via ordinary least squares. Expectiles for other values of  may be
estimated via a type of weighted ordinary least squares.
We dene the conditional severity function, sj ( ;X), as the weighted representation
below the population expectile e( ;X), where the weight is the distance je( ;X)  yj. That
is,
sj( ;X) =
R e(;X)
0
je( ;X)  yj fj(y;X)dyR1
0
je( ;X)  yj fj(y;X)dy
: (9)
Note that sj( ;X) =  for all  if and only if fj(y;X) = f(y;X), i.e., if group j has the
same joint distribution of (y;X) as the population as a whole.
We argue that the conditional severity function captures the economic cost, or sever-
ity, of under-representation in two related ways. First, note that the weights increase with
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distance from the cuto¤ e ( ;X). Therefore density far below the cuto¤, where the cost of
under-representation is greatest, is given greater weight than density just below the cut-
o¤. If we hold density below the cuto¤ (representation) constant, the conditional severity
function increases as the earnings distribution becomes more concentrated at very low lev-
els of earnings, and decreases as the distribution becomes more concentrated just below the
cuto¤. In contrast, if we hold density above the cuto¤constant, the conditional severity func-
tion decreases as the earnings distribution becomes more concentrated at very high levels
of earnings, because such concentration increases the denominator of the severity function.
Second, the conditional severity function can be interpreted in terms of conditional means
of y: The numerator of (9) is a scaled di¤erence between the expectile cuto¤ e ( ;X) and
the conditional mean of y given X below the cuto¤:R e(;X)
0
je( ;X)  yj fj(y;X)dyR e(;X)
0
fj(y;X)dy
= e( ;X) 
R e(;X)
0
y fj(y;X)dyR e(;X)
0
fj(y;X)dy
= e( ;X)  Ej[yjX; y < e( ;X)]
where Ej denotes the expectation for members of group j. Thus the numerator of (9) is
large if the groups conditional mean of earnings below the cuto¤ is small. The denominator
of (9) simply normalizes the conditional severity function to lie in [0; 1].
Thus our severity measure has a natural metric. For a given X, the severity measure
evaluated on the population as a whole equals  by the denition of the population expectile.
If sj( ;X) exceeds  , then the dollar-weighted representation of group j below the  th pop-
ulation expectile exceeds the dollar-weighted representation of the population. If sj( ;X)
is less than  , then the dollar-weighted representation of group j below the  th population
expectile is less than the dollar-weighted representation of the population.
The conditional severity function usefully supplements the conditional representation
function. For example, if for a given X, representation for group j in the bottom popula-
tion decile is 0:20, then the proportion of group js members in the bottom decile of the
distribution is twice that of the population as a whole. However, if the earnings of members
of group j are clustered just below the bottom decile cuto¤, then this over-representation
in the lowest decile is not very severe. The conditional severity function would illuminate
such a pattern. In this example, it might be the case that the severity measure for the
10th population expectile is 0:15, which would indicate that when weighted by dollars, the
over-representation in the bottom of the distribution is not as severe as the representation
index might suggest.
In the example above, we considered representation and severity with  = 0:10. Note,
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however, that in general the dollar value of the  th population quantile will not be the same as
the dollar value of the  th population expectile. We dene our severity measure based on the
expectile function to give it the natural metric described above. One could alternately dene
a conditional severity function directly from the population conditional quantile function,
for example, as the dollar-weighted representation below q( ;X). However, a conditional
severity function dened in this way would not have a natural metric. In particular, its
value for a group would only be meaningful relative to its value for the population as a
whole. In addition, such a measure of conditional severity would not be unique, because
q ( ;X) is not unique and hence neither are distances from q ( ;X) :
Like the representation function, the severity function, sj( ;X), depends on X. We
therefore desire a summary measure of severity for group j that averages over X, and dene
a conditional severity index, sj(), as
sj() =
1
Nj
X
ij
sj( ;Xi): (10)
Here, sj() is the average conditional severity for members of group j below the  th popula-
tion expectile cuto¤. If sj() is greater than  , then the earnings of the group are crowded
below the  th population expectile.
Replacing population quantities with sample estimates in (9) and (10) denes a sample
estimate of the conditional severity index, s^j (), based on a population-level estimated
expectile function. The expectile function e ( ;X) is easily estimated by expectile regression,
which is related to both ordinary least squares and quantile regression (see Newey and Powell
(1987), especially footnote 2). The di¤erences between these regression methods are most
easily understood as a di¤erence between the penalty function applied to deviations of yi from
a function, f(;Xi), which depends on parameters  and covariates X.3 Dening residuals
ui = yi   f(;Xi), all three regression approaches minimize (by choice of ) the sum of
penalized residuals,
PN
i=1 p (ui). In ordinary least squares, the penalty function is the square
function, p (u) = u2. In quantile regression, the penalty function is the weighted absolute
value function, p (u) = j   I(u < 0)j  juj. In expectile regression, the penalty function is the
weighted square function, p (u) = j   I(u < 0)j  u2. Thus, expectile regression combines
features of quantile regression and mean (OLS) regression.
For any value of  , the severity index is easily estimated in two steps. The rst step is to
estimate the population expectile regression function E^( ;X). Again, we use the notation
3For expositional clarity we describe the regression functions as parametric. In principle, we could replace
the parametric regression function f (;Xi) with a nonparametric regression function for all three types of
regression.
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E^ rather e^ because expectile regression typically embodies parametric structure even though
the expectile is dened without structure on F or Fj. Expectile regressions may be estimated
via iterated asymmetrically weighted least squares (see Newey and Powell (1987)) as follows:
given a pre-estimate of the regression function f(;Xi), compute weights j   I(ui < 0)j and
estimate the regression of y onX by weighted least squares (WLS). Then, update the weights
using the new estimates, and re-estimate the model by WLS. This process is repeated to
convergence, and the resulting regression model is the estimate E^( ;X).
Given an estimate E^( ;X) of the population expectile regression function, the second
step is to construct predicted values E^( ;Xi) for all i in group j; and compute s^j() as the
sample average of weighted representation below E^( ;Xi):
s^j() =
P
ij max
n
E^( ;Xi)  yi; 0
o
P
ij jE^( ;Xi)  yij
:
We dene an unconditional severity index, Sj(), analogously to the unconditional rep-
resentation index Rj(). A sample estimate of the unconditional  th expectile cuto¤ of the
population distribution, e(), solvesPN
i=1max fe^()  yi; 0gPN
i=1 je^()  yij
= 
for e^(). Again, since e() does not depend on X, neither expectile regression nor parametric
structure need be employed to obtain the estimate e^(). Instead, we may obtain e^() by
sorting the data by Y , and solving for e^(). A sample estimate of the unconditional severity
index for group j is
S^j() =
P
ij max fe^()  yi; 0gP
ij je^()  yij
:
As in the case of the representation index, we can compare the conditional severity index
to the unconditional severity index to assess the contribution of individual characteristics to
the severity of under-representation.
We close our discussion of the severity function and index by noting that its value and
interpretation depend on the scale of the outcome variable y: This is in contrast to represen-
tation, which is invariant to transformations of y. We point this out because it is typical in
applied labour economics to estimate models where the dependent variable is measured in
logarithms. Indeed, this is the case in our application below. This implies that the weights
should be interpreted as log-dollar distances, or approximately as percentage distances, from
the population expectile cuto¤.
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5 Results
We estimate our representation and severity indices on the universe of long form responses
to the 2001 Census of Canada. These are condential data, so we discuss replicability below
and in Appendix B. Census long forms are administered to twenty percent of Canadian
households, with the exception of households on Aboriginal reserves that are sampled at a
100 percent rate. All reported estimates are computed using sample weights provided by
Statistics Canada.4
We dene three broad ethnic categories of interest: Aboriginal, visible minority and white.
These categories correspond to those used in Canadian Employment Equity policy. A person
is classied as Aboriginal if their self-reported ancestry includes Aboriginal, Métis, Inuit, or
North American Indian. A person is classied as visible minority if they are not Aboriginal,
and their self-reported ancestry includes any region other than Canada, the United States,
Europe, Israel, Australia or New Zealand. All others are classied as white.
Our focus is on the native-born population, and our primary interest is on non-white
ethnic minorities. We focus on the native-born population to eliminate the potentially con-
founding e¤ects of immigration on the earnings distribution. Canadian-born visible minori-
ties comprise less than 2 percent of the Canadian-born population, and Aboriginals comprise
less than 3 percent. Estimation and inference therefore requires a large sample, so the uni-
verse of long form Census responses is ideally suited to this investigation. Our analysis
sample consists of all Canadian-born residents of Canada, 25 to 64 years of age, whose pri-
mary source of income is from wages and salaries, and who report positive schooling and
earnings.
We base the representation and severity indices on a frequently used measure of labor
earnings: the natural logarithm of annual gross earnings from wages and salaries. The
conditional indices control for age (8 categories), schooling (13 categories), marital status
(5 categories), household size, o¢ cial language knowledge (3 categories), and 12 area-of-
residence categories comprised of 10 Census Metro Areas (CMAs), a small CMA identier,
and a non-CMA identier.
Although Statistics Canada guidelines do not allow release of the exact counts of popula-
tion groups in our analysis, our analysis sample contains approximately 900,000 observations
each for men and women. In the interest of replicability, we present estimates based on the
Public Use Microdata File (PUMF) of the 2001 Census of Canada in the appendix. We do
not report estimates from the PUMF in the body of the paper because the PUMF has far
4Sample weights are constructed to replicate population counts by age, sex, marital status, mother tongue,
and household composition. See Statistics Canada (2003) for details.
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fewer observations than the (condential) database that we use. Appendix Table 1 reports
sample means in the PUMF, subject to the sample restrictions dened above. Weighted
sample means in our analysis sample match those in Appendix Table 1 to at least two dec-
imal places. The sample statistics contain no surprises. There is considerable dispersion in
earnings across demographic groups: the average earnings of men exceed those of women,
and the average earnings of whites exceed those of visible minorities and Aboriginal persons.
Table 1 presents estimates of the conditional and unconditional representation index
at the tenth, ftieth, and ninetieth percentile of log earnings. At each of these quantiles,
the representation of white men and women corresponds very closely to that of the entire
native-born population. This is unsurprising, given that white men and women comprise
over 95 percent of the native-born population. However, Aboriginals and visible minorities
are heavily over-represented below the tenth and ftieth percentiles, and under-represented
above the ninetieth percentile. In general, the magnitude of the representation index is more
extreme for Aboriginals than visible minorities, and interestingly, is more extreme for men
than for women. Recall that the indices in this paper are all presented as belowmeasures,
but can be characterized as abovemeasures by subtracting them from 1. In our discussion
below, we will focus mainly on the top and bottom deciles, and will discuss bottom decile
results with below measures in mind, and upper decile results with above measures in mind.
We begin a closer inspection of Table 1 with the least extreme group, female visible
minorities. Compared to the population of women, visible minority women are uncondition-
ally over-represented by almost 50 percent in the bottom decile of log earnings (R^j (0:10) =
0:149), and under-represented by nearly 20 percent in the top decile (R^j (0:90) = 0:919).
However, these values are almost completely explained by the characteristics of group mem-
bers (r^j (0:10) = 0:104; r^j (0:90) = 0:904).
Among men, visible minorities are quite heavily over-represented in the lower tail of the
distribution and under-represented in the upper tail: unconditionally, there are fully 2.26
times more male visible minorities below the tenth percentile of log earnings (R^j (0:10) =
0:226), and 41 percent fewer above the ninetieth percentile, than in the population (R^j (0:90) =
0:941). This is largely, but not completely, explained by their characteristics. Controlling for
individual characteristics reduces the representation index at the tenth percentile to 0.129,
and at the ninetieth percentile to 0.924. These results suggest that male visible minorities
face not only a glass ceiling that limits their opportunities at the top of the earnings distri-
bution, but also a sticky oor that limits their advancement beyond the lowest-paying jobs
in society.
Among both men and women, Aboriginals fare worse than visible minorities. Uncondi-
tionally, Aboriginal women are over-represented by 86 percent in the bottom decile of log
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earnings and under-represented by 58 percent in the top decile. The situation is even bleaker
for Aboriginal men, more than 70 percent of whom earn less than the median log earnings
of all native-born men. They are over-represented by 119 percent in the bottom decile and
under-represented by 66 percent in the top decile. Accounting for characteristics explains
about half of the disparity for women, but little of the disparity for men. Controlling for
individual characteristics, Aboriginal women remain over-represented in the bottom decile
by 42 percent, and under-represented in the top decile by 18 percent. Likewise, Aboriginal
men remain over-represented by 102 percent in the bottom decile, and under-represented by
33 percent in the top decile. Even after controlling for characteristics, nearly 66 percent of
Aboriginal men earn less than the median. We take these results as strong evidence that
Aboriginal men and women face a substantial glass ceiling, and an even more substantial
sticky oor.
Table 2 presents estimates of the severity index. For most groups, they tell a qualitatively
similar story to that of the representation index. However, we see that the representation
index substantially understates the impact of the glass ceiling and sticky oor for Aborig-
inal men. For this group, the severity index at the mean, S^j (0:50), is 0:856. Weighted
by (log-earnings) distance from the mean, the representation of Aboriginal men below the
0:50 expectile the mean is far higher than the population of native-born men. Indeed,
weighting by distance paints a more dismal picture than considering (unweighted) represen-
tation below the median of log earnings, bRj (0:50) = 0:705. This is because the earnings of
Aboriginal men are concentrated in the lowest part of the log earnings distribution.
The severity of over-representation below the mean is substantially reduced when one
accounts for the characteristics of Aboriginal males. The conditional severity index at the
mean, bsj (0:50), is 0:731, which is 0:125 lower than the unconditional severity index. This
remains very large, however, as we can see from the corresponding above measure. Even con-
trolling for characteristics leaves the weighted representation (that is, severity) of Aboriginal
men above the conditional mean at approximately half of that of all native-born men.
6 Conclusion
The representation index provides an intuitive and easily computed measure of a groups
representation in a region of the earnings distribution. The index may be formulated to
condition on observable characteristics, or not. We augment the representation index with
a severity index that weights representation by the distance from a cuto¤, and so provides a
measure of the economic cost, or severity, of under-representation to the under-represented
group. In conjunction, the representation and severity indices provide a comprehensive
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picture of under- and over-representation and its economic consequences. They represent
an important addition to the toolkit of applied researchers studying glass ceiling and sticky
oor phenomena.
In our application to Canadian data, we nd strong evidence that Aboriginals and visible
minorities are under-represented in the conditional upper decile of the population earnings
distribution, and are over-represented in the conditional lower decile of the population earn-
ings distribution. This suggests that these groups face both glass ceilings and sticky oors.
A Appendix: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. In equation (6), j maps the conditional cumulative distribution
of y given X from group to group. Since the quantile function, qj, is the inverse of Fj, an
implication of (6) is
Fj(q1( ;X)jX) = j()
which is independent of X. If, for example, 2(0:5) = 0:6, this implies that the median
earnings for group 1 is the 60th percentile of earnings for group 2 at all values of X. The
restriction (6) ensures that the  th quantile of y conditional on X for the population has the
same shape as some quantile for any group in the population.
Let j  Nj=N denote the proportion of the population that belongs to group j, so thatPJ
j=1 j = 1. Given the restriction (6), the population-level quantiles are implicitly dened
by
JX
j=1
jj (F1(q( ;X)jX)) =  :
Since the left-hand side is a weighted sum of monotone increasing functions of a single
argument F1(q( ;X)jX), it is invertible with respect to this argument, and there must exist
a monotone increasing function 1 such that
F1(q( ;X)jX) = 1():
Here, 1 is similar to j for j = 2; :::; J , in that it is independent of X, but di¤ers in that 1
maps from the population-level quantiles into the conditional cdf of group 1.
The representation of group j is then given by
Fj(q( ;X)jX) = j(1())
and it is independent of X.
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B Appendix: Replicability
In the interest of replicability, we estimate the representation and severity indices on the
Public Use Microdata File (PUMF) of the 2001 Census of Canada. These are presented
in Appendix Tables 2 and 3. The conditional measures correspond very closely to those
obtained on the universe of long form responses (Tables 1 and 2). However, there are
notable discrepancies between the unconditional representation and severity estimates in the
PUMF and the universe data. This is to be expected, given the nature of the sample weights
in the two les (all our estimates are computed using sample weights provided by Statistics
Canada). In particular, the sample weights are designed to match population counts by age,
sex, marital status, mother tongue, and household composition (see Statistics Canada (2003)
for details). However, they do not directly depend on the distribution of earnings. Thus
we observe signicant di¤erences in the unconditional estimates, but this di¤erence vanishes
when we condition on age, sex, marital status, mother tongue, and household composition.5
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τ = 0.1 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.9 τ = 0.1 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.9
Women
White 0.098 0.494 0.901 0.098 0.497 0.897
Visible Minorities 0.149 0.559 0.919 0.104 0.507 0.904
Aboriginal Persons 0.186 0.643 0.958 0.142 0.560 0.918
Men
White 0.099 0.489 0.898 0.096 0.493 0.896
Visible Minorities 0.226 0.672 0.941 0.129 0.555 0.924
Aboriginal Persons 0.219 0.705 0.966 0.202 0.656 0.933
Source: Author's calculations based on all long form responses to the 2001 Census of Canada. Simulated standard errors are
available on request.  All standard errors are less than 0.002.
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.9 τ = 0.1 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.9
Women
White 0.095 0.488 0.895 0.098 0.495 0.898
Visible Minorities 0.153 0.615 0.929 0.117 0.531 0.913
Aboriginal Persons 0.242 0.747 0.971 0.156 0.615 0.932
Men
White 0.093 0.479 0.893 0.096 0.488 0.896
Visible Minorities 0.231 0.743 0.958 0.138 0.594 0.936
Aboriginal Persons 0.334 0.856 0.986 0.224 0.731 0.957
Source: Author's calculations based on all long form responses to the 2001 Census of Canada. Simulated standard errors are
available on request.  All standard errors are less than 0.001.
Unconditional Conditional 
Representation Index for Selected Demographic Groups 
Table 1
Unconditional 
Table 2
Severity Index for Selected Demographic Groups 
Conditional 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
ln(Earnings)
White 10.4 0.96 9.92 1.07
Visible Minorities 10.3 1.08 10.0 1.15
Aboriginal Persons 9.86 1.22 9.52 1.27
Age (years) 41.2 9.86 41.0 9.64
Number of household members 3.01 1.33 2.98 1.29
Single-person household (percent in category)
Ethnicity (column percent in category)
White
Visible Minorities
Aboriginal Persons
Knowledge of Official Languages (column percent in category)
English only
French only
Both English and French
Highest level of educational attainment (column percent in category)
Less than grade 5
Ggrades 5 to 8
Grades 9 to 13
High school graduate
Trades certificate or diploma
College, without college or trades certificate or diploma
College, with trades certificate or diploma
College, with college certificate or diploma
University, without college certificate, diploma, or degree
University, with certicate/diploma below bachelor level
University, with bachelor or first professional degree
University, with university certificate above bachelor level
University, with master's degree[s]
University, with earned doctorate
Marital Status (column percent in category)
Single. never married
Married, including common-law
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Region of Residence (column percent in category)
Montreal
Toronto
Vancouver
All other Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs)
Not in a CMA
Number of Observations
Source: Author's calculations based on the Public Use Microdata File (PUMF) of the 2001 Census of Canada. 
118,203 114,682
63.9
13.8
22.3
64.5
12.5
23.0
16.3
70.1
3.79
8.24
1.65
12.2
31.7
41.1
31.5
40.5
10.2
5.13
10.6
5.16
11.9
Appendix Table 1
Summary Statistics in the Public Use Microdata File (PUMF)
95.5
1.63
2.90
95.4
1.65
2.91
0.39
12.2 11.0
2.68
5.10
20.3
71.5
15.3
2.54
3.14
0.32
6.20
20.3
3.21
8.38
12.7
16.0
2.95
6.75
12.9
1.70
3.51
0.63
11.8
13.8
3.59
6.38
16.2
14.1
5.42
6.40
Men Women
0.50
3.22
0.28
1.87
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.9 τ = 0.1 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.9
Women
White 0.098 0.501 0.899 0.098 0.497 0.900
Visible Minorities 0.093 0.450 0.883 0.107 0.522 0.898
Aboriginal Persons 0.179 0.668 0.954 0.140 0.562 0.908
Men
White 0.098 0.511 0.898 0.096 0.494 0.898
Visible Minorities 0.145 0.592 0.910 0.126 0.562 0.930
Aboriginal Persons 0.254 0.732 0.964 0.202 0.664 0.928
Source: Author's calculations based on the Public Use Microdata File (PUMF) of the 2001 Census of Canada. Simulated 
standard errors are available on request.  All standard errors are less than 0.006.
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.9 τ = 0.1 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.9
Women
White 0.097 0.493 0.898 0.098 0.496 0.899
Visible Minorities 0.102 0.454 0.873 0.124 0.535 0.904
Aboriginal Persons 0.212 0.725 0.964 0.142 0.594 0.922
Men
White 0.094 0.485 0.895 0.095 0.488 0.897
Visible Minorities 0.146 0.609 0.927 0.142 0.602 0.937
Aboriginal Persons 0.292 0.813 0.979 0.232 0.739 0.956
Source: Author's calculations based on the Public Use Microdata File (PUMF) of the 2001 Census of Canada. Simulated 
standard errors are available on request.  All standard errors are less than 0.003.
Appendix Table 3
Severity Index for Selected Demographic Groups, PUMF
Unconditional Conditional 
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Unconditional Conditional 
